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Abstract 
The currencies of sixteen African countries, namely those belonging to the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), to the Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community (CAEMC), Comoros and Cape Verde, have been pegged to 
the euro since the inception of the new European currency in 1999. This paper assesses 
whether the euro is an adequate anchor for those countries. The evaluation is based on 
three key criteria borrowed from the optimal currency area (OCA) theory and the 
conclusion is that the euro is an appropriate currency for anchoring only in the case of 
Cape Verde. Since the members of WAEMU and of CAEMC are jointly pegged to the 
euro, the paper further assesses whether the grouping of countries in these two CFA 
monetary unions receives economic support. Based on the OCA criteria used to 
investigate the first issue, the conclusion is that the composition of CAEMC does not 
conform to basic requirements. In contrast, for a wide group of WAEMU countries 
there is room for sharing a common monetary policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Sixteen African countries have their currencies pegged to the euro since the inception of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Among them, Cape Verde and Comoros 
have their own central banks and their own currencies, the Cape-verdian escudo and the 
Comorian franc, respectively. The remaining countries are grouped in two monetary 
unions, each with a common currency issued by a single central bank. Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo form the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Banque Centrale des Etats 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) is their central bank. Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon form the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC), whose central bank is the 
Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Central (BEAC).1 Although issued by separate central 
banks, the currencies of WAEMU and CAEMC are both known as CFA franc and they 
have the same parity against the euro. Each CFA franc is legal tender only in its 
issuance area.2  
 
Now, when more than a decade has elapsed since the beginning of the new peg, an 
assessment of its adequacy is both feasible and pertinent. This is one of the main 
purposes of this paper and is carried out in section 2. We address the issue providing an 
economic assessment based on key criteria borrowed from the optimum currency areas 
(OCA) literature. Motivated by the results of section 2, we additionally assess the 
grouping of countries in the two regional African monetary unions currently pegged to 
the euro. This exercise is carried out in section 3, by using the same empirical strategy. 
Finally, in section 4 we summarize the results and point out some concluding remarks. 
 
The remaining of this introduction fulfills three objectives. First, we briefly describe 
some institutional details of the exchange-rate regimes of the African countries that 
                                                 
1
 The WAEMU and the CAEMC are also known by the French acronyms UEMOA and CEMAC, 
standing, respectively, for Union Economique et Monetáire Ouest Africaine and Communauté 
Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale. 
2
 Until independence, the acronym CFA stood for Colonies Française de l’Afrique. Since then, CFA 
stands for Communauté Financière Africaine in the case of WAEMU and Cooperation Financière en 
Afrique Centrale in the case of CAEMC. 
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have their currencies pegged to the euro. Second, we motivate and introduce the 
empirical strategy adopted in the assessments carried out in sections 2 and 3. Third, we 
highlight the main contributions of our paper and we relate it to the existing literature. 
 
Institutional framework  
The current peg to the euro is, in all the sixteen African countries, a continuation of 
previous fixed exchange rate arrangements having as reference European currencies that 
were replaced by the euro in 1999. The Cape-verdian escudo was previously pegged to 
the Portuguese escudo, while the Comorian franc and the CFA francs were pegged to 
the French franc. 
 
When the French franc and the Portuguese escudo were about to be replaced by the 
euro, the European Council has formally authorized the continuance of the exchange 
rate arrangements in force between the African countries and France and Portugal.3 
With the changeover to the new reference currency, no realignment took place. 
Accordingly, the new parities were set at the crossed exchanges rates that both the 
Portuguese escudo and the French franc were converted into euro and they have been 
fixed now for more than ten years.4 
 
In the case of the fifteen African countries belonging to the franc zone, the peg is part of 
foreign exchange cooperation agreements signed with France in 1972 and 1973. The 
main elements of the agreements are the following: 
- a fixed parity with reference to the French franc/euro (the only realignment occurred in 
1994, when the CFA franc was devalued by 50 per cent and the Comorian franc was 
devalued by 33 per cent); 
- no restrictions to capital movements within each CFA franc monetary union and with 
France; 
- unlimited convertibility guarantee for the CFA and Comorian francs, provided by the 
French Treasury; 
                                                 
3
 For the legal details of the authorization of the European Council see, for example, Lamine (2006). 
4
 The fixed exchange rates are 655.957 CFA francs, 491.96775 Comorian francs and 110.265 Cape-
verdian escudos per euro. 
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- pooling of the foreign reserves of the members of each monetary union at the union’s 
central bank;  
- transfer of part of the net foreign reserves of the BCEAO, the BEAC and the central 
bank of Comoros to Operations Accounts managed by the French Treasury.5  
 
Although in theory the central banks of the African franc zone have access to unlimited 
financing from the French Treasury, the agreements contain provisions preventing the 
likelihood of such event. In particular, when the balance of the Operations Accounts 
reaches critical figures, measures are taken to improve it (e.g., increase in the central 
bank interest rates). 
 
In the case of Cape Verde, the peg is part of a foreign exchange cooperation agreement 
established in 1998 with Portugal. As part of the agreement and in order to support the 
fixed exchange rate system, the Portuguese Treasury provides Cape Verde with a 
limited credit facility in Portuguese escudos (now in euros), at a concessional interest 
rate.  
 
Empirical strategy 
The OCA theory has developed some criteria that are useful for assessing the adequacy 
of a fixed exchange rate system.6 In this paper we follow Alesina and Barro (2002) and 
focus on three of the most relevant: the degree of trade integration, inflation 
performance, and the correlation of business cycles. As theoretically shown by Alesina 
and Barro (2002), the type of country that gains more by joining a monetary union is (i) 
a small open economy that trades heavily with the members of the union, (ii) with a 
history of high inflation, and (iii) with a business cycle highly correlated with the cycle 
of the union. Most of the reasons that make these criteria decisive for participation in a 
monetary union also apply for adhering to a fixed exchange rate system. In particular, 
                                                 
5
 “Compte d’Opérations” is a sort of current account in French francs (now in euros) comprising overdraft 
facilities. The deposits at the operations account are subject to minimum amounts. These amounts have 
been gradually reduced. Currently, the African franc zone central banks have to deposit at the French 
Treasury at least 50 per cent of their net holdings of foreign reserves. 
6
 For a survey of the OCA literature see, inter alia, Mongelli (2005). 
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(i) Pegging to the currency of the main partners reduces exchange rate risk, which 
encourages international trade and foreign investment.7 It is true that, by pegging, a 
country gives up the use of the exchange rate for demand management purposes, which 
may be seen as a cost. However, for the case of small open economies, which typically 
have low product diversification, the exchange rate is an instrument with weak 
effectiveness due to the high pass-through from import prices to domestic prices. 
(ii) Adopting a fixed exchange rate provides “the advantage of tying one’s hands” (in 
the words of Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). By pegging to a currency issued by a central 
bank with a good anti-inflationary reputation, a country is forced to follow the sound 
monetary policies of the anchor, thus being able to achieve low rates of inflation. 
(iii) A country with a fixed exchange rate regime gets the benefits mentioned in (i) and 
(ii), but faces the potential cost of losing monetary policy autonomy, namely becoming 
unable to use the interest rate to smooth output fluctuations. However, this is only a 
relevant cost if output fluctuations are not synchronized with those of the anchor 
economy. In case they are synchronized, the monetary policies of the anchor will fit the 
needs of the pegged countries. Furthermore, in case of, say, a synchronized economic 
slowdown in both the anchor and the pegged countries will lead to a common decrease 
in interest rates which, in turn, will lead to an exchange rate depreciation against third 
countries, improving net exports. 
 
The empirical evidence clearly suggests that developing countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes benefit from lower inflation rates, as compared with countries with more 
flexible regimes. Among others, this is documented by Bleaney and Fielding (2002) for 
the CFA franc countries. The updated descriptive statistics for the post-1999 period 
displayed in section 2 confirm that, in fact, the African countries that have been pegged 
to the euro display a better inflation performance than the rest of the continent. In short, 
the African euro trackers seem to have achieved the benefit described in (ii) above. Yet, 
inflation performance is not the only decisive criterion for judging whether the peg to 
the euro is an adequate option. In fact, even assuming that exchange rate pegging is the 
only available strategy for African countries to achieve price stability, one can think of 
                                                 
7
 This benefit is enhanced in a monetary union, where the exchange rate risk fully vanishes, the same 
applying to foreign exchange transaction costs. 
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alternative anchors (e.g., the USD or the SDR).8 Hence, we focus our assessment on 
criteria (i) and (iii), i.e., trade intensity with the Euro Area and synchronization of 
business cycles. Recently, Meissner and Oomes (2009) came to the general conclusion 
that for countries that decide to peg their exchange rate, the two criteria are key 
determinants in the choice of the anchor. Our investigation uncovers if such rationale 
also applies to the sixteen African countries that are currently pegged to the euro. 
 
The empirical application of the Alesina-Barro framework is problematical however, as 
the theory is mute regarding the minimum level of trade integration and output 
correlation required for choosing an anchor currency. Our empirical strategy consists of 
adopting, as an ad hoc benchmark, the historical values for these two indicators 
recorded during the same period for twelve members of the EMU (the eleven countries 
that founded the union in 1999, plus Greece). These countries have had their exchange 
rates fixed to the euro since they joined the EMU, at the conversion rates with which 
they have replaced domestic currencies (along the paper we will interchangeable call 
this set of countries EMU12 and Euro Area).9 The EMU12 is used as a reference in a 
graphical representation similar to Frankel’s (1999), which effectively summarizes 
criteria (i) and (iii). 
 
As the main conclusion from the individual analyses is that the peg to the euro has not 
been adequate for most of the countries under investigation, we then consider the 
optimality of the regional monetary unions to which most of them belong. In fact, 
fourteen countries in the sample did not decide the peg to the euro on an individual 
basis; rather, that decision resulted from their participation in a monetary union 
(WAEMU or CAEMC) that had as anchor a currency that joined the euro. This, plus the 
argument that “the franc zone is largely the result of a historical accident” (Fielding, 
2005), motivates the analysis conducted in section 3, where we assess whether there is 
                                                 
8
 The most common strategies for achieving price stability are exchange rate pegging, central bank 
independence and inflation targeting. It is widely acknowledged that for developing countries only the 
first strategy is actually available. 
9
 The 11 founders of EMU are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece joined EMU in 2001 but it kept the exchange rate of the 
drachma fixed to the euro between 1999 and 2001. Currently, the EMU is formed by sixteen countries. 
Slovenia joined in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008 and Slovakia in 2009. 
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economic support for the current grouping of countries in the two CFA monetary 
unions. Again, we base the assessment of the optimality of the two CFA monetary 
unions on Alesina-Barrro’s criteria (i) and (iii) – the degree of intra-union trade and the 
correlation of business cycles of each country with the aggregate business cycles of the 
corresponding union. As previously, we then use as an ad-hoc benchmark the 
corresponding records for the EMU.  
 
Related literature and contribution 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to appraise whether the euro is an 
adequate anchor for the set of African countries that in 1999 shifted their pegs to the 
new European currency – the issue that we address in section 2. Research on this matter 
for the pre-euro period is not abundant and has taken different approaches. The most 
common one has been the analysis of the properties of real exchange rates – see, e.g., 
Coleman (2008). 
 
Assessing the optimal gathering of countries in a monetary union – the issue that we 
address in section 3 – has been receiving a lot of attention, which is extensively 
reflected in the literature. In the particular case of Africa, different perspectives have 
been adopted. Some studies have analyzed the use of a single currency in the whole 
continent (see, e.g., Masson and Pattillo, 2004a, Karras, 2006, and Tapsoba, 2009). 
Some others have checked whether OCA requirements apply to existing regional 
economic areas, to enlargements of existing regions and to projected union areas. 
Examples of such assessments are found in Masson and Pattillo (2001), Debrun, 
Masson and Pattillo (2003, 2005, 2010), Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), Bénassy-
Quéré and Coupet (2005), Buigut and Valev (2005, 2006), Buigut (2006), Yehoue 
(2006), Houssa (2008), Masson (2008), Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008), and 
Carmignani (2009).10 
 
In our analysis, we focus exclusively on the WAEMU and on the CAEMC and check 
whether they are optimal monetary unions, using data only for the recent period of their 
peg to the euro. The investigation that most closely relates to ours is Bayoumi and Ostry 
                                                 
10
 Tavlas (2009) provides an excellent survey on the creation of a monetary union in Southern Africa. 
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(1997), in the sense that common evaluation criteria are applied to the CFA franc zone. 
Besides the use of updated data, our investigation differs slightly from theirs in that we 
do not look at the CFA franc zone as a single arrangement but, rather, as two separate 
monetary unions as, indeed, they officially are. 
 
Our paper further contributes to the literature by using Frankel’s (1999) diagram in an 
empirical assessment. In fact, the well-known diagram relating trade integration with 
business cycles synchronization as joint criteria for assessing the appropriateness of a 
common monetary policy has been only used to set a theoretical frontier. 
 
2. Has the euro been a suitable anchor? 
In order to assess whether the euro has been an adequate anchor for the current African 
peggers, in this section we look at the performance of the sixteen African countries vis-
a-vis the Euro Area as regards inflation, trade integration and synchronization of 
business cycles.11 The analysis covers the period 1999-2008.12  
 
Inflation 
For the period of the peg to the French franc, Bleaney and Fielding (2002) found that 
the exchange rate regime helped the CFA countries to achieve significantly lower levels 
of inflation than the typical floating-rate developing country (although at the cost of 
higher macroeconomic volatility). As Table 1 shows, such conclusion seems to hold 
also for the period of the peg to the euro. The table displays the averages and standard 
deviations of the inflation rates of the sixteen countries for the period 1999-2008. For 
                                                 
11
 Our analysis implicitly assumes that the monetary policy of the sixteen countries in our sample closely 
followed the EMU policy. However, it could be argued that capital controls allow for autonomous 
monetary policies. While this argument cannot be fully set aside, Veyrune (2007) notes that in 1994 
occurred a structural shift in the franc zone, which led to decreasing monetary autonomy. Shortland and 
Stasavage (2004) also come to the conclusion that monetary autonomy in the franc zone is limited and 
that short term central bank rates of the anchor (first the Banque de France and now the European Central 
Bank) have key influence on the monetary policy of WAEMU. 
12
 We exclude 2009 from the sample period, for two reasons. First, to avoid as much as possible the noise 
related with the recent global financial and economic crises, which have been transmitted from the 
developed world into the emerging countries, albeit with some lag. Second, to minimize the use of data 
that are still preliminary estimates (some of the data for African countries from 2009 onwards are still 
reported by the sources as such). 
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comparative purposes, the table includes the corresponding values for the EMU12, the 
sub-Saharan Africa, and the whole continent of Africa.  
 
Table 1. Average and standard deviation of inflation rates, 1999-2008 
Country/Region 
Inflation rate (%) Inflation differential vs EMU (pp) 
Average Standard deviation Average 
Standard 
deviation 
EMU12 (a) 2.46 0.73 - - 
Africa 9.18 2.30 6.72 2.21 
Sub-Saharian Africa 10.76 2.98 8.30 3.06 
Cape Verde 2.32 3.02 - 0.14 2.95 
Comoros 4.00 1.38 1.54 1.10 
WAEMU (a) 2.65 3.21 0.19 2.87 
Benin 3.17 2.36 0.71 1.98 
Burkina Faso 2.66 3.70 0.20 3.31 
Guinea-Bissau 2.94 4.32 0.48 3.97 
Ivory Coast 2.73 1.90 0.27 1.58 
Mali 2.24 3.98 - 0.22 3.65 
Niger 2.51 4.29 0.05 3.90 
Senegal 2.28 2.08 - 0.18 1.83 
Togo 2.69 3.05 0.23 2.70 
CAEMC (a) 3.15 3.80 0.69 3.67 
Cameroon 2.70 2.15 0.24 2.04 
Central African Republic 2.98 3.45 0.52 3.09 
Chad 1.87 7.12 - 0.59 6.79 
Equatorial Guinea 5.04 2.47 2.58 2.28 
Gabon 3.46 5.92 1.00 6.23 
Republic of Congo 2.84 1.68 0.38 1.57 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28 (accessed in May 2010); values for the aggregates 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). 
Note: (a) Simple (un-weighted) average across member countries. 
 
In general, the sixteen African countries that have been pegged to the euro recorded 
quite low levels of inflation. Four of them (Cape Verde, Mali, Senegal and Chad) show 
average inflation rates that are even lower than the average of the Euro Area. Thirteen 
African countries, out of the sixteen in the sample, display inflation differentials vis-a-
vis the Euro Area that are less than 1 percentage point. The remaining three countries 
(Gabon, Comoros and Equatorial Guinea) have had average inflation differentials 
slightly higher, but nevertheless visibly lower than those observed for aggregate Africa 
and aggregate sub-Saharan Africa. 
 10 
 
The inflation rates of the countries pegged to the euro have had a substantial volatility, 
but not much higher than the volatility recorded by aggregate Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Hence, the unavailability of the exchange rate to accommodate supply and 
demand shocks has not led the African countries pegged to the euro to suffer from a 
markedly higher degree of inflation variability. 
 
Overall, the results described in Table 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that the peg 
to the euro has granted a good inflation performance. However, from the behavior of 
inflation alone it is not possible to draw the conclusion that the euro has been an 
adequate anchor for the countries under analysis. Anchoring to the USD, the SDR or 
any other basket of currencies issued by low-inflation developed countries would, very 
likely, lead to a similar inflation performance. Thus, in order to assess whether the euro 
has been an appropriate anchor, we now look at the other two key criteria: trade 
integration with Euro Area countries and the synchronization of business cycles.  
 
Trade integration 
In Table 2 we provide the degree of trade integration of the African countries that are 
pegged to the euro. Trade integration is measured as the sum of imports and exports of 
goods and services, divided by twice the GDP. For comparative purposes, the table also 
presents the (simple) average of the EMU12 countries. The figures reported in column I 
measure only exports to and imports from the Euro Area, providing the degree of 
openness relative to EMU12. Column II reports the total degree of openness to the 
World, i.e., accounts for total exports and imports of each country. The third column 
displays the proportion of trade with EMU12 in total trade. Due to data scarcity, the 
figures reported in Table 2 refer to the period 2002-2007. The figures are averages over 
the period. 
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Table 2. International trade in goods and services, 2002-07 
Country/Region Openness (% of GDP) III = (I)/(II) EMU12 (I) World (II) (%) 
EMU12 (a) 17.5 38.3 45.7 
Cape Verde 27.8 48.4 57.4 
Comoros 11.3 25.0 45.2 
WAEMU: (a) 11.3 32.5 34.8 
   Benin 8.4 26.5 31.7 
   Burkina Faso 5.7 19.5 29.2 
   Guinea-Bissau 9.2 22.7 40.5 
   Ivory Coast 14.3 46.2 31.0 
   Mali 7.8 33.5 23.3 
   Niger 9.9 25.0 39.6 
   Senegal 16.9 36.3 46.6 
   Togo 18.1 50.5 35.8 
CAEMC: (a) 12.2 45.4 26.9 
   Cameroon 12.4 24.9 50.0 
   Central African Republic 9.5 17.7 53.7 
   Chad 5.3 50.7 10.5 
   Equatorial Guinea 17.2 69.5 24.7 
   Gabon 14.7 41.8 35.2 
   Republic of Congo 14.1 68.1 20.7 
Sources:- EMU12 (accessed in May 2010): Eurostat, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/. 
- Remaining data (accessed in May 2010):  
-  Trade in goods and services with the EMU: Eurostat, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/; total trade in goods: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Handbook of Statistics on line, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1; total trade 
in services: International Trade Centre (ITC), available at 
http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm;  
-  GDP: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx. 
Note:   (a) Simple (un-weighted) average of the ratio of openness across the member countries.  
 
In comparison to the EMU12 (which featured a total degree of openness of 38.3% of 
GDP), seven countries under analysis are more open. They are Cape Verde (48.4%), 
Ivory Coast (46.2%), Togo (50.5%), Chad (50.7%), Equatorial Guinea (69.5%), Gabon 
(41.8%) and the Republic of Congo (68.1%). However, out of these seven countries, 
only two have a degree of trade with EMU12 that is higher than the average of EMU12 
internal trade (17.5%). They are Cape Verde (27.8%) and Togo (18.1%).  
 
In seven countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Central African 
Republic, and Chad) the average of exports to and imports from EMU12 represents less 
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than 10% of the respective GDP.13 From the last column, one can see that there are three 
countries (Cape Verde, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic) whose trade with 
the EMU12 represents at least 50% of their total trade. However, out of this group only 
Cape Verde has a high degree of total openness. 
 
With the exception of Cape Verde, the general picture that emerges from Table 2 is that 
the African countries that have been anchored to the euro do not show particularly high 
trade intensities with the Euro Area. Accordingly, the trade benefits obtained from 
having their exchange rates fixed are hardly high.  
 
Moreover, in some countries exports are concentrated in a limited number of 
commodities. Since commodities are traditionally priced in dollars, those exports do not 
benefit from exchange rate stability against the euro, even when the exports are to Euro 
Area countries. This point is made clear in Table 3, where we provide information on 
the shares of exports of different goods in total exports of each country. We have 
selected the most representative goods and services and, among them, we have 
identified those considered as commodities (shadowed lines in Table 3) based on the 
classification presented in the Indices of Primary Commodity Prices, 1999-2010, 
published by the IMF14. The figures reported are averages for the most recent five years 
with available data (typically 2004-08). 
                                                 
13
 It is likely that figures for coastal countries are overestimated while figures for landlocked countries are 
underestimated. The reason is that some imports by landlocked countries are actually re-exports by 
coastal countries. 
14
  Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/table1a.pdf.  
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Table 3. Export structure by main type of product as a share of total exports (%), average of most recent 5 years  
    WAEMU CAEMC 
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01 Live animals               8.8                 
03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes 2.6               12.2               
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers               6.1                 
08 Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons     3.9   82.9                       
09 Coffee, tea, mate and spices   15.8                             
12 Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes       4.8                         
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations           25.5       7.9 6.2           
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes     3.8                           
25 Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement          3.7 20.5        
26 Ores, slag and ash               36.3             8.3   
27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc 6.6   3.6     28.0     13.8   41.9   91.0 94.7 75.1 85.2 
28 Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes                 6.4               
33 Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toileteries   4.7                             
44 Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal                     12.5 32.5     11.6   
52 Cotton     30.5 63.1     19.5     23.0   6.2         
59 Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric     5.3                           
62 Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 0.9                               
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof 0.8                               
71 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc             53.0 7.7       22.2         
72 Iron and steel                   4.6             
86 Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment 1.9                               
87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway       6.0             
89 Ships, boats and other floating structures   10.6                             
90 Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus   3.5                             
99 Commodities not elsewhere specified   9.8                             
200 Services 83.6 52.2 38.1 14.5 9.6 9.9 19.1 18.3 36.4 25.6 24.4 28.7 3.8 0.5 2.5 3.2 
Goods (representing at least 5% of total exports of goods) and services as % of total exports 96.4 96.6 85.2 82.4 92.5 69.5 91.6 77.3 72.5 81.8 85.0 89.7 94.8 95.1 97.4 88.4 
 of which commodities 9.2 15.8 38.0 67.9 82.9 53.6 19.5 42.5 26.1 31.0 60.6 38.8 91.0 94.7 95.0 85.2 
 
Source: - International Trade Centre (ITC), available at http://www.intracen.org/menus/countries.htm (accessed in May 2010). Notes: Data refer to commodities with 5% or more of total exports of goods plus services exports, as percentage of total 
exports; average values for 2004-08 for Cape Verde, Ivory Cost, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Republic of Congo; for the remaining countries, average values for 2003-07. 
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As can be seen in Table 3, Cape Verde is the country that has had the highest degree of 
integration with the Euro Area and that has the lowest share of commodities in its 
exports (only 9.2%). This suggests that Cape Verde may have been able to reap the 
trade benefits of the peg to the euro. On the other extreme, most countries either have a 
very small integration with the Euro Area (see Table 2) or a very high share of 
commodities in their exports (as shown in Table 3). Note that, on average, commodities 
represent 45.2% and 77.5% of total exports, for WAEMU and CAEMC, respectively. 
 
Another perspective to look at trade data is the origin and destination of goods and 
services. Since all the sixteen countries have been colonies of a European country, it 
would not be surprising that trade with the former colonizer – and thus with Europe – 
had a large share in their international trade flows. However, the relative importance of 
such bilateral trade seems to be decreasing, at least for the fourteen WAEMU and 
CAEMC countries, as suggested by Figure 1 and Figure 2. These figures display, 
respectively, historical data on exports to and imports from the Euro Area by the set of 
WAEMU countries and the set of CAEMC countries. Prior to 1999, there was already a 
decreasing trend in the share of trade with the Euro Area countries. From 1999 onwards, 
and in spite of the substantial widening of the economic area to which the WAEMU and 
CAEMC currencies became pegged, the relative importance of trade with the Euro Area 
kept decreasing. The persistence of such decreasing trend, together with the relatively 
high weight of commodities in the exports of many of these countries, casts serious 
doubts on the benefits of the peg to the euro, as far as trade is concerned.15 
 
                                                 
15
 The peg to the euro, the appreciation of the euro against the dollar in the first years of the current 
century, plus the decreasing weight of trade with the Euro Area have very likely changed the real 
effective exchange rate of the CFA franc zone. According to Hallet (2008), between 2000 and 2006, there 
was a real effective appreciation of 14%. 
 15 
Figure 1. WAEMU and CAEMC exports to the Euro Area, 1989-2008 
 
Source: - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – Handbook of Statistics on 
line, available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1 
(accessed in May 2010). 
 
Figure 2. WAEMU and CAEMC imports from the Euro Area, 1989-2008 
 
Source: - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – Handbook of Statistics on 
line, available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1 
(accessed in May 2010). 
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Synchronization of business cycles 
We gauge synchronization using the linear correlation coefficient between the output 
gap of each country ( ig ) and the gap of the Euro Area ( EMUg ): 
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where ig  and EMUg  are the corresponding average output gaps for the sample period 
(which are essentially zero, by construction). In spite of its simplicity, correlation 
coefficients have been extensively used in recent studies of business cycle 
synchronization, irrespectively of the approach used to measure the cycle – see De 
Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008) for a survey.16 
 
For the period 1999-2008, Table 4 provides the results for business cycle 
synchronization between each country under analysis and the Euro Area. As a reference, 
in the first line of the table we also report the degree of business cycle synchronization 
within the Euro Area, measured as the simple average of the correlation coefficients of 
each EMU12 member output gap with the gap of the aggregate EMU12 (obtained with 
the same method and for the same period as for the African countries).  
 
The output gaps have been computed from annual time series of real GDP from 1980 to 
2008.17 Although higher frequency data would be more adequate for studying exchange 
rate and monetary policies, there are no available or reliable quarterly real GDP data for 
the African countries in our sample period. While quarterly data for industrial 
production indexes has been used elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Rand and Tarp, 2002) 
we do not find such approach particularly useful, in view of the large weight of 
agriculture and commodities in the GDP of most of the countries. We also choose not to 
                                                 
16
 Many studies go beyond simple contemporary correlations and (i) compare correlations for different 
sample periods (or look at rolling correlations) or (ii) compute non-contemporaneous correlations. Given 
our purposes and the small dimension of our sample, we merely compute the correlations for the whole 
euro-peg period (1999-2008). We also chose not to look at non-contemporaneous correlations as they 
would only be relevant for assessing the adequacy of a single monetary policy if the data had higher 
frequency. 
17
 The data source for the African countries is the World Economic Outlook database of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), while Euro Area data have been obtained from AMECO. See: World Economic 
Outlook Database of the IMF, version April 2010, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx, and AMECO database, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm. 
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follow the artificial alternative of implementing a merely statistical interpolation of 
annual GDP data (e.g. Shortland and Stasavage, 2004).18 
 
Output gaps were obtained by filtering the log of real GDP with the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The smoothing parameter λ was set at 6.25, the 
value that mimics with annual data the results obtained with the HP filter on quarterly 
data (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002).19  
 
The econometric framework adopted here corresponds to a deviation cycle approach to 
the measurement of the business cycle (for a comparison with the alternative classical 
and growth cycle approaches, see Artis, Marcellino and Proietti, 2004). The specific 
choice of the HP filter, rather than alternative procedures requiring estimation, is due to 
the scarcity of data resulting from its periodicity and the purpose of focusing the 
analysis only on the period of the peg to the euro.20  
 
As Table 4 shows, out of the sixteen African countries pegged to the euro, only two 
have business cycles that may be considered significantly synchronized (at standard 
levels of significance) with that of the Euro Area. They are the Central African Republic 
                                                 
18
 Some studies use per capita real GDP, rather than real GDP. We argue that per capita GDP would be 
suitable if (i) the period under analysis was considerably larger, (ii) the reliability of population statistics 
was more satisfactory and (iii) the empirical assessment would not involve a proper extraction of the 
cyclical component of the original time-series. Still, as a sensitivity check, we have computed the output 
gaps and their correlation to the EMU12 cycle, using per capita real GDP data. The results (available 
upon request) are qualitatively similar to those herein presented. 
19
 The resulting output gaps, as well as all data used in this paper, are available from the authors upon 
request. 
20
 We are well aware of yet other alternative approaches to the measurement of co-movements of real 
output, often used in the literature of optimal currency areas, which compute the correlation between 
output shocks. As surveyed by Tavlas (2009), this approach has in fact two main bodies of literature. 
First, a number of studies follows Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) and computes the co-movement 
between output shocks estimated from auto-regressive processes for (the log of) relative real outputs. 
Second, several studies compute the co-movements between demand and supply shocks estimated from 
structural VARs identified along the lines of Blanchard and Quah (1989). Bayoumi and Ostry (1997, page 
428) argue that the identification of supply and demand shocks may not be successfully implemented in 
the African context, as in Africa most of the supply shocks are temporary and would thus be identified as 
demand shocks with the Blanchard-Quah approach; they consequently use an approach in the spirit of 
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002). Because we focus on a period of merely 10 years, with annual data, 
we are unable to follow any of these econometric approaches, as well as alternative methods for the 
extraction of deviation cycles requiring estimation rather than calibration.  
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and Cape Verde, with correlation coefficients of 80 percent and 74 percent, 
respectively.21,22 Moreover, the synchronization of business cycles of these two 
countries with the Euro Area is not markedly lower than the synchronization recorded 
by the individual members of EMU12 (they display a simple mean of 82 percent). We 
do not find any geographic rationale for the results of these two countries since the 
Central African Republic and Cape Verde are not neighbors and do not belong to the 
same regional African monetary union (Cape Verde is an archipelago and does not 
belong to the CFA arrangement, while the Central African Republic is a landlocked 
country belonging to the CAEMC).  
 
Among the remaining fourteen countries, there are nine cases of negative correlations 
(statistically significant in the case of Niger) and those that are positive are not 
statistically significant. The lack of business cycle synchronization for most of the 
countries suggests that the peg to the euro represents actually a cost for many of them, 
in the sense that they are subject to monetary policies that do not fit the needs of their 
observed output fluctuations. Thus, on the basis of this economic criterion, the euro 
does not seem an adequate anchor for most of the African countries that have had their 
currencies pegged to the European currency. 
 
                                                 
21 As is well known, under the null hypothesis that the true correlation between X and Y is ρ=0, if the 
sample in which the observed correlation r is computed is not smaller than N=6, then the test statistic 
)2/()1( 2 −−
=
Nr
r
t is approximately distributed as a Student-t with degrees of freedom df=N-2. In 
this paper, given the sample size N=10, correlation coefficients equal or larger than 0.55 may be 
considered statistically different from 0 at the usual 5 percent level of significance. 
22 The high correlations found for Cape Verde and the Central African Republic still hold when the 
sample is successively extended backwards to include additional years through 1993-2008. 
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Table 4. Correlation coefficients with the Euro Area business cycle, 1999-2008 
Country/Region Correlation coefficient 
EMU12 (a) 0.816 
Cape Verde 0.741 
Comoros -0.473 
WAEMU: 
Benin 0.005 
Burkina Faso -0.325 
Guinea-Bissau 0.304 
Ivory Coast -0.025 
Mali -0.504 
Niger -0.556 
Senegal 0.133 
Togo -0.185 
CAEMC: 
Cameroon 0.066 
Central African Republic 0.796 
Chad -0.468 
Equatorial Guinea -0.221 
Gabon -0.493 
Republic of Congo 0.187 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (a) Simple (un-weighted) average of the correlations of the member countries. 
Values in bold are positive and statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent level of significance.  
 
One obvious explanation for the low synchronization of business cycles found for many 
countries relative to the Euro Area is the concentration of production and exports in a 
limited number of commodities, as mentioned above. Such a feature leads to 
idiosyncratic shocks related with swings in world prices, and the corresponding changes 
in terms of trade, as well as shocks related with the impact of climate conditions on 
crops (see, e.g., Hoffmaister, Roldós and Wickham, 1998, Kose and Riezman, 2001, 
and Van den Boogaerde and Tsangarides, 2005).23 The sensitivity of the African 
countries to supply shocks is apparent in the fact that the variability of their output gaps 
is, overall, quite larger than the variability of the EMU12 countries’ output gaps.24 
                                                 
23
 Houssa (2008) provides a description of the events behind demand and supply shocks of the members 
of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). Most of those countries are part of our 
sample. 
24
 For the sake of space conservation, figures for the volatility of the output gaps are not reported. We 
note, however, that the high correlations of the Central African Republic and Cape Verde in Table 4 are 
particularly noteworthy, given that the standard deviations of both countries’ output gaps are quite larger 
than that of the Euro Area (0.024 and 0.016, respectively, which compare with 0.007 for the Euro Area). 
The only countries with a cyclical volatility not higher than the Euro Area’s are Benin, Cameroon and 
Comoros, but their output gaps do not correlate positively with the Euro Area output gap. 
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Trade integration and cyclical synchronization: a joint assessment 
Following Frankel (1999), we provide in Figure 3 a joint assessment of criteria (i) and 
(iii). The figure jointly displays the correlations from Table 4 and the degree of trade 
integration from the first column of Table 2 (trade with the Euro Area as percentage of 
domestic GDP). As an ad hoc reference for judging the adequacy of the peg, we use the 
integration-synchronization record of the EMU12 countries.  
 
In addition to the position of each African country in the integration-synchronization 
nexus and the position of the average of the EMU12 countries, our figure includes a 
vertical and a horizontal orientation lines that cross the EMU12 locus. These lines 
define four quadrants in the diagram: the first quadrant identifies the countries that 
perform better than the average EMU12 members in both indicators; the third quadrant 
identifies countries that fare worse in both criteria; in the second and fourth quadrants 
lay the countries that fare better in one and worse in the other indicator. The EMU12 
average is represented as a triangle, Cape Verde and Comoros as diamonds, the 
WAEMU members as squares and the CAEMC members as circles. 
 
Figure 3. Cyclical correlation and trade integration with EMU12 
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The figure clearly shows that the Central African Republic and Cape Verde are the only 
countries in the sample that are close to the EMU12 benchmark. Note that Cape Verde 
has a remarkable performance concerning trade with the Euro Area, being even quite 
more integrated than the average of the EMU12 countries. The high trade integration of 
Cape Verde helps in explaining its high synchronization of business cycles. This is a 
clear case of a country that has adopted the right anchor to peg. In the case of the 
Central African Republic, the high correlation of business cycles with EMU12 is harder 
to explain, given the relatively low level of trade integration with the Euro Area.  
 
The remaining countries are all located in the third quadrant at a relatively (and un-
favorable) high distance from the reference point. In general, for these countries, our 
findings do not support their current exchange rate regime. 
 
Given our conclusion that the euro, according to our criteria, is not an appropriate 
anchor for most of the countries under analysis, we have replicated the exercise for the 
most obvious alternative, the US dollar. The results found for the degree of openness 
and correlation of business cycles of the 16 countries relative to the US are reported in 
the Annex. The main conclusion that can be drawn from those results is that for Cape 
Verde the euro is clearly an adequate anchor while for the remaining countries neither 
the euro nor the dollar are superior alternatives relative to each other. Some CAEMC 
countries are clearly more open relative to the US than to the Euro Area (Chad and 
Congo) and 3 countries in the sample have business cycles clearly better synchronized 
with the US than with the Euro Area (Burkina Faso, Senegal and Togo). On the whole, 
our findings raise two issues, namely: (i) instead of pegging to a single currency, would 
not be more appropriate for most of the countries to adopt a peg against a basket of 
currencies? (ii) Given the diversity of performances, is it appropriate for all the 
countries in the sample to have a common anchor? This latter question can be translated 
into another one: are the CAEMC and the WAEMU appropriate groupings of countries? 
Answering the first issue involves finding for each country the right basket of currencies 
for anchoring, a task which is beyond the scope of this paper. The second issue is 
analyzed in what follows. 
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3. The CFA franc monetary unions: are they optimal? 
Adding to previous findings in the literature, we have presented evidence that the fixed 
exchange rate regime has been an appropriate strategy for keeping inflation under 
control in Cape Verde, Comoros and in the fourteen CFA countries. However, for most 
of them, a deeper analysis led us to conclude that the euro has not been the right 
currency for anchoring.  
 
Truly, for the fourteen CFA countries, the peg to the euro was not an individual decision 
but a collective one, taken for the whole monetary union to which they belong. And we 
cannot disregard that the gathering of countries in the WEAMU and CAEMC is the 
continuation of an administrative division from the French colonial era, hardly based on 
OCA requirements. The purpose of this section is just to assess whether there is 
economic support for the grouping of the CFA countries in the two existing monetary 
unions.  
 
As in section 2, we carry out the assessment for 1999-2008, on the basis of Alesina and 
Barro’s criteria, and using the corresponding historical records for the EMU12 as 
benchmark. Since we have already seen that low inflation is common to the sixteen 
African countries, we limit the analysis to intra-union trade and to the synchronization 
of business cycles within each monetary union – criteria (i) and (iii).  
 
For a period previous to the euro-peg, Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) have conducted an 
exercise similar to ours and found that neither the WAEMU nor the CAEMC were 
optimal monetary unions. This section will allow for checking whether such a 
conclusion still applies with more recent data.25  
 
                                                 
25
 The only technical difference between our empirical strategy and Bayoumi and Ostry’s (1997) occurs 
in the study of business cycle synchronization. To compute the correlations we use output gaps while they 
use the residuals of autoregressive models of the log change of real GDP. This technical alternative is 
discarded due to our limited number of observations. 
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Trade integration 
For the period 2003-2008, Table 5 reports the relative importance of international trade 
in goods of each WAEMU and CAEMC country with the remaining members of the 
respective monetary union. Column I provides intra-union trade of each country relative 
to GDP, column II provides total trade relative to GDP, and column III represents the 
intra-union trade of each country relative to its total international trade. For each of 
these three indicators, the table also reports the global figure for each monetary union, 
which is the sample mean of their members. As an ad-hoc benchmark, we also provide, 
for the three indicators, the simple mean of the EMU12 countries.  
 
The relative importance of total trade is similar in both monetary unions. In WAEMU 
total trade represents, on average, 26.2% of the corresponding GDP, while in CAEMC it 
represents 34.4%. However, in the case of CAEMC, internal trade is almost non-
existing, since it represents only 0.6% of GDP and 1.7% of total trade. In the case of the 
WAEMU, the figures are slightly higher: intra-union trade represents, on average, 3.6% 
of GDP and 13.7% of total trade.26 Compared to the Euro Area, internal trade in CFA 
monetary unions is very low. In fact, on average, intra-EMU12 trade represents 15.5% 
of the corresponding GDP and about one half of total trade. 
 
The very low levels of intra-union trade, both in WAEMU and CAEMC, can be 
explained on different grounds. Regarding exports, the main explanation in that for 
many countries production is confined to a small number of primary commodities that 
are inputs essentially used by industrial countries. As regards imports, most are 
investment and consumer goods that are not produced by the neighbor African countries 
– belonging to the monetary union – but rather by developed countries. Civil unrest and 
poor infrastructures, namely poor transportation and communications networks, are also 
relevant factors hampering intra-union trade (see, inter alia, Longo and Sekkat, 2004). 
 
                                                 
26
 Concerning the figures reported in Table 5, two notes are in order: (i) Official statistics for intra-trade 
of WAEMU and CAEMC are very likely under-reporting actual trade due to informal transactions carried 
between neighboring regions of different countries. In any case, there is a consensus that even if figures 
for actual trade were available, intra-union trade would still represent a small proportion of international 
trade of WAEMU and CAEMC. (ii) Part of the trade counted as intra-union (particularly in the case of 
WAEMU) is actually trade between coastal and landlocked countries of goods in transit. 
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Table 5. International trade in goods, 2003-08 
Country/Region Openness (% of GDP) III=(I)/(II) 
Intra-union (I) World (II) (%) 
EMU12 (a) 15.5 31.2 49.7 
WAEMU (a) 3.6 26.2 13.7 
Benin 2.3 20.5 11.2 
Burkina Faso 3.7 16.0 23.1 
Guinea-Bissau 4.8 19.3 24.9 
Ivory Coast 2.5 38.1 6.6 
Mali 4.4 26.0 16.9 
Niger 1.8 20.4 8.8 
Senegal 2.7 27.2 9.9 
Togo 6.8 41.9 16.2 
CAEMC (a) 0.6 34.4 1.7 
Cameroon 0.6 17.3 3.5 
Central African Republic 1.1 11.7 9.4 
Chad 0.8 35.0 2.3 
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 55.9 0.0 
Gabon 0.6 35.2 1.7 
Republic of Congo 0.4 51.1 0.8 
Sources:  - EMU12: Eurostat, (accessed in June 2010) available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database and at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database  
. - Remaining data (accessed in June 2010): 
- Trade: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) - Handbook of 
Statistics, available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1. 
- GDP: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database, April 2010, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx. 
Note: (a) Simple (un-weighted) average of the ratio of openness across the member countries. 
 
Overall, the information provided makes clear that one of the main benefits from 
sharing a common currency does not hold in the case of the two CFA monetary unions. 
In fact, intra-trade is supposed to be boosted through the vanishing of both foreign 
exchange transactions costs and exchange rate risk.27 However, for the reasons just 
mentioned, it is not surprising that other structural factors may out-weight the potential 
trade benefits resulting from a single currency. Accordingly, great emphasis should not 
be put on intra-trade as a criterion for deciding the adequacy of an African monetary 
union. 
                                                 
27
 The low figures for intra-trade in CFA monetary unions seem to go against empirical findings that 
currency unions have a large positive effect on international trade (see, e.g., Rose, 2000). However, 
Carrère (2004) and Masson and Pattillo (2004b) note that trade within CFA monetary unions are around 
three times higher than trade between African countries with own currencies. 
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Synchronization of business cycles 
Given that trade benefits are not relevant, it must be the case that the costs cannot either 
be high. Otherwise, participation in a monetary union does not have any economic 
support. We next check a specific potential cost ensuing from participation in WAEMU 
and CAEMC, namely the loss of monetary autonomy. The task is carried out by 
analyzing the synchronization of business cycles within each monetary union. 
 
We start by computing the correlations of bilateral business cycles within WAEMU and 
CAEMC. The results are reported in Table 6 and may be summarized as follows. Half 
of the twenty-eight cross-correlations for WAEMU countries are negative, while in the 
case of the CAEMC there are ten out of fifteen cross-correlations that are negative. 
None of the five positive correlations recorded in CAEMC is above 0.55, the critical 
point for rejection of the null of insignificance at a one-sided 5 percent probability level 
(assuming normality and taking into account the sample size).28 In the WAEMU 
countries, there are five significantly positive cross-correlations. Specifically, the output 
gap of Burkina Faso has a positive and significant correlation coefficient with the output 
gaps of Ivory Coast and Niger. Additionally, we find positive and statistically 
significant synchronization of business cycles for the pairs Senegal-Togo and Mali-
Niger. 
 
                                                 
28
 Our results for CAEMC are in line with those reported in a recent paper by Carmignani (2009). On the 
basis of output gaps, he also finds that the business cycles of CAEMC countries are not synchronized and 
that some of them display negative correlation coefficients. 
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Table 6. Correlation coefficients between national business cycles, 1999-2008  
Monetary Union WAEMU 
Countries Ben BFa Gui ICo Mal Nig Sen Tog 
 
 
 
Ben 
 
-0.52 0.21 -0.31 0.31 0.30 -0.56 -0.63 
BFa 
  
-0.43 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.48 
Gui 
   
-0.55 -0.27 -0.32 -0.45 -0.77 
ICo 
    
0.28 0.33 0.50 0.40 
Mal 
     
0.85 -0.08 -0.05 
Nig 
      
-0.18 -0.01 
Sen 
       
0.55 
Monetary Union CAEMC 
Countries Cam CAR Cha EqG Gab RCo 
  
 
Cam 
 
 0.01 -0.06  0.24 -0.47 -0.70 
  
CAR 
  
-0.54 -0.07 -0.46 0.19 
  
Cha 
   
0.47 0.23 -0.08 
  
EqG 
    
-0.14 -0.28 
  
Gab 
     
-0.08 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: - Ben: Benin; BFa: Burkina Faso; Gui: Guinea-Bissau; ICo: Ivory Cost; Mal: Mali; Nig: Niger; 
Sen: Senegal; Tog: Togo; Cam: Cameroon; CAR: Central African Republic; Cha: Chad; EqG: 
Equatorial Guinea; Gab: Gabon; RCo: Republic of Congo; 
- Values in bold are positive and statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent level of 
significance. 
 
We have also computed the correlations between the output gaps of each country and 
the output gap of the respective monetary union. Since real GDP data for the aggregate 
WAEMU and CAEMC are not available, we had to choose and implement some 
aggregation method. Such decision involved (i) deciding between constant or time-
varying weights and (ii) choosing the specific loading for each country’s real output. As 
regards the first decision, we used varying weights, specifically the share of each 
country’s nominal GDP in the respective aggregate in each year. Regarding the measure 
of nominal GDP used to weight each country’s real GDP, we have computed two 
alternative series, for the sake of some sensitivity check. In the first series we 
considered as weights the share of GDPs evaluated in US dollars at current market 
exchange rates (usd). In the second series, we considered each country’s GDP evaluated 
at purchase power parity (ppp). Once we have computed the aggregate real GDP of 
WAEMU and CAEMC, we then computed their output gaps using, as with the 
individual countries, the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25. 
Finally, we computed the correlation between the output gaps of each country and the 
output gaps of the corresponding monetary union.  
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In Table 7 we report the results, which are broadly in line with what could be expected 
from the previous analysis for pairs of countries. Half of the WAEMU members have 
positive and significant correlations of their business cycles with the aggregate 
WAEMU cycle, while about a third of the CAEMC countries have positive and 
significant correlations with the aggregate CAEMC cycle. More specifically, as regards 
the WAEMU, Burkina Faso, Ivory Cost, Mali, Niger, have their business cycles 
significantly correlated with the aggregate cycle, while Senegal and Togo have lower 
but still positive correlations. In contrast, Benin and Guinea-Bissau have negative 
correlations, clearly implying that the single monetary policy of WAEMU is not 
appropriate for these two countries. Regarding the CAEMC, Chad and Equatorial 
Guinea have a significant degree of synchronization with the aggregate cycle, while 
Cameroon, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo correlate negatively 
and Gabon has a positive but not significant degree of synchronization. 
 
In short, we find much more cyclical heterogeneity among CAEMC countries than 
among the WAEMU countries, which questions the existence of the former 
arrangement. Our results are in line with those obtained by Fielding, Lee and Shields 
(2004), using earlier data and a different technique (namely, identification of supply and 
demand shocks with structural vector error correction models). Their conclusion is that 
(page 513) “there is less heterogeneity in the macroeconomic dynamics of the UEMOA 
(WAEMU) countries than there is among the CEMAC (CAEMC) members, and so the 
costs of adhering to a single currency are likely to be lower, ceteris paribus”. 
 
The main reason for the lack of synchronization of business cycles is essentially the 
same that determines low synchronization with the Euro Area. Many of the countries 
under investigation are producers and exporters of a low number of commodities (that 
often differ from country to country), which is a source of idiosyncratic shocks. 
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Table 7. Correlation coefficients with the aggregate business cycle of WAEMU and 
CAEMC, 1999-2008 
Monetary Union 
Country 
WAEMU 
usd 
WAEMU 
ppp 
CAEMC 
usd 
CAEMC 
ppp 
WAEMU 
Benin -0.265 -0.241   
Burkina Faso 0.820 0.836   
Guinea-Bissau 
-0.622 -0.615   
Ivory Coast 0.875 0.850   
Mali 0.612 0.651   
Niger 0.617 0.661   
Senegal 0.540 0.510   
Togo 0.461 0.441   
CAEMC 
Cameroon   -0.299 -0.114 
Central African Republic 
  -0.221 -0.407 
Chad 
  0.809 0.860 
Equatorial Guinea 
  0.667 0.753 
Gabon 
  0.376 0.463 
Republic of Congo 
  0.066 -0.102 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: - The table shows the correlation coefficient between the output gaps of each country (rows) and 
the output gaps of the respective monetary union (columns); 
- Values in bold are positive and statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent level of 
significance. 
 
It is worth noting in Table 7 that the business cycle correlations within WAEMU and 
CAEMC are overall robust to the weighting method used in the computation of the 
union-aggregate real GDP. It should further be noted that the results do not seem to be 
driven by the dominance of any individual country in the two union-aggregate real 
GDPs. In the WAEMU, the largest weight is that of Ivory Coast (about 30 percent), 
followed by Senegal (about 20 percent), which ranks only fifth as regards correlation 
with the aggregate. In the CAEMC, the largest weights are those of Cameroon (about 30 
percent) and Gabon (about 20 percent), but these countries correlate either negatively or 
not significantly with the aggregate. 
 
Trade integration and cyclical synchronization: a joint assessment 
The results of this section are summarized in Figure 4 and Figure 5 for WAEMU and 
CAEMC, respectively. The diagrams are similar to that used by Frankel (1999) for 
judging optimal currency areas, with the vertical axis measuring the correlation of the 
business cycle of each country with the cycle of the union’s aggregate output (weighted 
 29 
by GDPs evaluated at usd), and the horizontal axis measuring trade of each country with 
the remaining partners of the union (as % of GDP). As a reference point, we plot in each 
diagram the average figures of intra-union trade and correlation of business cycles for 
EMU12, as well as two crossing lines defining four quadrants, as in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 4. Cyclical correlation and trade integration in WAEMU 
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Figure 5. Cyclical correlation and trade integration in CAEMC 
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Given the reported low level of intra trade in both CFA monetary unions (more evident 
in the case of the CAEMC), the only quadrants that become relevant are the third and 
the fourth. In the case of CAEMC, all the members fall in the third quadrant, with the 
exception of Chad, which has a correlation of business cycles with the union that is of 
the same magnitude that, on average, we find for the Euro Area. 
 
In the case of WAEMU, two countries (Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso) have a better 
performance than the average of EMU12, concerning synchronization of business 
cycles with the aggregate of the unions. The remaining WAEMU members fall in the 
third quadrant. 
 
Overall, this section confirms, for the euro-pegging period, the previous findings of 
Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) obtained for a period when the CFA francs were pegged to 
the French franc. Based on criteria (i) and (iii) of Alesina and Barro (2002), our results 
show that the current composition of both WAEMU and CAEMC does not conform to 
the theory of optimal currency areas. This is also in line with Bénassy-Quéré and 
Coupet (2005), who, using a different approach concluded that neither the WAEMU nor 
the CAEMC are optimum areas. 
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A difference between CAEMC and WAEMU should, however, be underlined. While in 
Figure 5 the combination of the two criteria leads to scattered points along the vertical 
axis, in Figure 4 we can define a cluster of countries from which only Benin and 
Guinea-Bissau are excluded. Visual inspection thus clearly tells us that the CAEMC 
does not receive any support at all from the OCA theory. The same cannot openly be 
said for a narrower WAEMU. 
 
4. Conclusions and final remarks 
This paper has assessed the adequacy of the exchange rate regimes of sixteen African 
countries that are pegged to the euro since the inception of the new European currency. 
We did it in two steps. In the first, we have appraised the adequacy of the euro as the 
anchor currency. The results found in the first step led us to the second one, in which we 
have checked whether the grouping of countries in WAEMU and in CAEMC is 
appropriate or not. These issues have been empirically addressed using the OCA criteria 
highlighted in Alesina and Barro (2002), and using as a benchmark the performance of 
Euro Area countries.  
 
Regarding the conclusions reached, the first one is that the peg to the euro has granted 
the sixteen countries a good inflation performance. In contrast to what happened in most 
African countries and in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, inflation rates in most of the 
countries analyzed did not markedly differ from the low rates observed in the Euro 
Area. Because this conclusion does not imply that the euro has been the right anchor (as 
pegging to another low inflation currency or currency-basket of currencies could yield a 
similar inflation performance), we went on to study trade integration and business cycle 
synchronization. This investigation led us to a second conclusion. 
 
Our second conclusion is that the euro has not been an adequate anchor for most of the 
African countries that are currently pegged to the European currency. The only clear 
exception is Cape Verde. The additional finding that the US dollar is not a superior 
alternative to the euro paves the way for further research on the basket of currencies 
recommended for these countries to peg, a task which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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In prospect, the inadequacy of the euro as anchor currency could lead to problems of 
sustainability of the fixed exchange-rate regimes of these African countries. Such a 
scenario has recently been voiced by Coleman (2008), who foresaw difficulties if the 
current parities were to be maintained. However, others have been more optimistic 
about their sustainability, in view of the specificities of the CFA arrangements that may 
act as shock absorbers, namely through the financial support provided by the French 
treasury – see e.g. Yehoue (2007). 
 
Given the conclusions regarding the peg to the euro and in view of how WAEMU and 
CAEMC were formed, we have also assessed whether each monetary union receives 
support from the OCA theory. This led to the third and last conclusion of the paper. 
Overall, none of the two CFA monetary unions shows trade-intensity and cyclical-
synchronization performances that conform to the requirements of an optimal currency 
area. Even if we disregard intra-union trade, we still find no support for CAEMC due to 
the idiosyncratic business cycles of its members; in contrast, there is a wide group of 
WAEMU countries whose business cycles can be managed with a common monetary 
policy. 
 
As a final remark, two caveats are in order. First, our data are rather limited, as we 
could only use annual observations for a relatively short period – the 10 year period of 
the peg to the euro. A richer dataset would allow for a refinement of the econometric 
approach and for more robust results. Second, our conclusions are based only on 
economic criteria and, more specifically, on a sub-set of the OCA criteria. Considering 
other economic criteria – either within or outside the OCA theory, e.g., international 
cooperation and development support – could lead to somewhat different conclusions. 
And, a fortiori, considering other dimensions, such as the political one, the current 
arrangements may well receive support. Investigation of other economic or non-
economic issues involving the choice of the exchange rate regime is, however, beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
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Annex 
 
Table A.1. International trade in goods, 2003-08 (a) 
Country/Region 
Openness (% of GDP) (%) 
EMU (I) US(II) World (III) (I)/(III) (II)/(III) 
Cape Verde 17.9 1.0 23.9 74.9 4.2 
Comoros 7.4 0.6 14.8 50.0 4.1 
WAEMU (b) 8.6 1.3 26.2 32.8 5.0 
Benin 6.8 2.0 20.5 33.2 9.8 
Burkina Faso 3.9 0.2 16.0 24.4 1.3 
Guinea-Bissau 7.3 0.9 19.3 37.8 4.7 
Ivory Coast 12.4 2.7 38.1 32.5 7.1 
Mali 4.7 0.3 26.0 18.1 1.2 
Niger 6.0 1.5 20.4 29.4 7.4 
Senegal 11.1 0.7 27.2 40.8 2.6 
Togo 16.3 2.1 41.9 38.9 5.0 
CAEMC (b) 9.1 9.8 34.4 26.5 28.5 
Cameroon 10.7 1.2 17.3 61.8 6.9 
Central African Republic 5.6 0.9 11.7 47.9 7.7 
Chad 2.5 11.3 35.0 7.1 32.3 
Equatorial Guinea 16.2 16.8 55.9 29.0 30.1 
Gabon 10.2 13.3 35.2 29.0 37.8 
Republic of Congo 9.4 15.6 51.1 18.4 30.5 
Sources:  - EMU12: Eurostat, (accessed in June 2010) available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/external_trade/data/database and at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database 
- Trade in goods with the US: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination 
Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/ 
(accessed in September 2010). 
. - Remaining data (accessed in June 2010): 
- Trade in goods with the EMU: Eurostat, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/; total trade in goods: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Handbook of Statistics on line, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1. 
- GDP: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database, April 2010, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx. 
Notes: (a) This table differs from Table 2 in the main text with two respects: (i) due to lack of 
homogeneous information on the trade in services with the U.S., we report international trade 
only in goods; (ii) once we use only trade in goods we are able to update the results until 2008. 
As shown in Table 3, and excluding Cape Verde and Comoros, trade in goods represents most of 
international trade of the countries in the sample.  
(b) Simple (un-weighted) average of the ratio of openness across the member countries. 
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Table A.2. Correlations with the U.S. business cycle, 1999-2008 
Country/Region Correlation coefficient 
Cape Verde 0.458 
Comoros -0.379 
WAEMU: 
Benin -0.751 
Burkina Faso 0.296 
Guinea-Bissau -0.243 
Ivory Coast 0.342 
Mali -0.523 
Niger -0.502 
Senegal 0.678 
Togo 0.507 
CAEMC: 
Cameroon 0.100 
Central African Republic 0.357 
Chad 0.166 
Equatorial Guinea -0.337 
Gabon -0.598 
Republic of Congo -0.045 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Values in bold are positive and statistically different from 0 at the 5 percent level of significance.  
 
 
